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Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Under Title VII After Baldwin v. Foxx
By Ryan H. Nelson*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Baldwin
v. Foxx opined—for the first time—that employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Article tackles the two
administrative law questions that Baldwin poses: what level of
deference should a court afford Baldwin, and should such
deference force that court to overturn precedent holding that
sexual orientation discrimination lies beyond the purview of Title
VII?
First, after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnhart, lower
courts have split on whether Chevron Step Zero should be
governed by the rule-of-law test announced in Christensen and
Mead, or whether Barnhart’s five-factor test provides a new
standard for this inquiry. This Article explains why the
Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test should govern Chevron Step
Zero; why that test dictates that courts should analyze Baldwin
under the deference test announced in Skidmore, not Chevron;
and why Baldwin consequently deserves de minimis deference.
Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brand X held that
judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes must be overturned
in the face of subsequent, contrary agency interpretations that
would have earned Chevron deference but for stare decisis. Yet, no
exception to stare decisis exists when an agency interpretation of
an ambiguous statute earns mere Skidmore deference. This Article
examines such a potential exception, concluding that stare decisis
Ryan H. Nelson is Corporate Counsel for Employment Law at MetLife, one of
the largest global providers of insurance, annuities, and employee benefit
programs. He received his J.D., cum laude, from the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Yeshiva University, and his B.S.B.A. with a major in Economics
from the University of Florida. The views espoused in this Article are those of
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should trump agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
Skidmore deference notwithstanding.
This Article concludes that Baldwin is far from a watershed
moment for LGBT workplace equality. Rather, the courts—which
have almost uniformly held that employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation does not violate Title VII—should
uphold such decisions despite Baldwin and the meager Skidmore
deference it earns. Indeed, congressional action remains the only
way to ban employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation on a national scale.
I. Introduction
On July 16, 2015, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued its opinion in Baldwin v. Foxx,1
concluding that allegations of employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of
discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).2 While Baldwin is
technically limited to workplaces in the federal sector, there is
little doubt that the EEOC and the plaintiffs’ bar will seek to use
the opinion in litigation to support the position that employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violates Title
VII. To that end, this Article focuses on two of the prospective
questions that will inevitably dog courts hearing such cases in the
months and years to come: what level of deference should courts
afford the Baldwin decision, if any, and should such deference
force courts to overturn existing precedent holding that sexual
orientation discrimination is beyond the purview of Title VII?
Part II of this Article argues that Baldwin presents an ideal
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify whether an
administrative agency interpretation must have the force of law
for a court to analyze that interpretation under the deference test
announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
1. Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 16, 2015).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10.
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Council, Inc.,3 as suggested by the Court’s prior decisions in
Christensen v. Harris County4 and United States v. Mead Corp.,5
or conversely, whether the five-factor test announced in Barnhart
v. Walton6 is more than mere dicta, providing instead a new
standard in assessing which deference test applies to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it administers. This Article concludes
that the Barnhart factors are mere dicta, that the “force of law”
rule endorsed by both Christensen and Mead should continue to
control the Chevron Step Zero inquiry,7 and consequently, that
Baldwin should be analyzed under the framework established in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,8 not Chevron. Assuming the foregoing to
be true, applying Skidmore demonstrates that Baldwin earns but
a modicum of deference—so little, in fact, that one could question
whether the opinion earns any deference at all.
Part III explores Baldwin’s potential to answer another
administrative law question left as-yet unanswered by the
Supreme Court. In National Cable & Telecommunication Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services,9 the Court settled the tension between
judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes and subsequent,
contrary agency interpretations that would have been entitled to
Chevron deference but for adherence to stare decisis.10 In sum,
Brand X announced a new rule that Chevron deference to an
agency’s interpretation must trump traditional notions of stare
decisis so long as the statute at issue is ambiguous.11 However,
the Court has yet to address this tension when the agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute lacks the force of law (for
instance, when the interpretation earns only some level of
3. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
5. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
6. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
7. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187
(2006) [hereinafter Chevron Step Zero] (providing “an understanding of the
foundations and nature of the Step Zero dilemma” and suggesting how to
resolve this dilemma).
8. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
9. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
10. Id. at 984–86.
11. Id.
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Skidmore deference). This Article concludes that courts should
stand by their interpretations of ambiguous statutes rather than
uproot them in the face of subsequent, contrary agency
interpretations lacking the force of law. Applying that conclusion
here, and assuming arguendo the conclusion in Part I to be
correct, the courts—which have almost uniformly held that
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation lies
beyond the reach of Title VII12—should uphold their decisions,
despite the Baldwin opinion and the meager Skidmore deference
courts must afford it.
In sum, this Article concludes that Baldwin does not bring
advocates of a national ban on employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation to the finish line; rather, it reminds us
how much farther we still have to go. While the opinion reaches
the right result, it earns de minimis deference, the likes of which
should not overturn contrary court decisions interpreting Title
VII. As such—even in the wake of Baldwin—the one and only
way to ban employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation on a national scale is for Congress to act.
II. Chevron Step Zero
The Supreme Court’s landmark Chevron decision held that,
under certain circumstances, courts must defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that it
administers.13 To qualify for Chevron deference, a court must ask
whether Congress has directly spoken on the precise question at
issue and, if so, give effect to Congress’s unambiguously
expressed intent (Chevron Step One); if the statute is silent or
ambiguous, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation of
the statute so long as it is permissible (Chevron Step Two).14 In
contrast, agency interpretations that do not qualify for Chevron

12. See infra note 71 (enumerating cases in which courts have found that
Title VII does not apply to sexual orientation discrimination).
13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
14. Id. at 842–43.
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deference are analyzed under the test announced in Skidmore,15
which requires courts to afford weight to agency interpretations
depending on: (i) the thoroughness evident in the agency’s
consideration; (ii) the validity of the agency’s reasoning; (iii) the
agency’s consistency with earlier and later pronouncements; and
(iv) all those factors that give the agency power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.16
Yet, a trio of Supreme Court cases in the early 2000s
attempted to address a vital threshold question colloquially
known as Chevron Step Zero: which agency interpretations
should be analyzed under the Chevron test, as compared to the
Skidmore test?17 As demonstrated below, those three cases lay
out the precedent necessary to conclude that the EEOC’s Baldwin
opinion should be analyzed under Skidmore, not Chevron.
A. Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart
First, in Christensen, the Court considered what deferential
weight to afford an opinion letter issued by the Wage and Hour
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor, holding that
[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the
force of law [and were not arrived at after, for example, a
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking]—do
not warrant Chevron-style deference. Instead, interpretations
contained in formats such as opinion letters are “entitled to
respect” under our decision in [Skidmore], but only to the
extent that those interpretations have the “power to
persuade.”18

Yet, the Court declined to clarify whether the opinion letter was
not subjected to a Chevron analysis because: (i) it “lack[ed] the
15. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(distinguishing decisions in the format of opinion letters from those subject to
the Chevron test).
16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
17. See infra Part II.A (discussing Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart).
18. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
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force of law”; (ii) it was not arrived at after formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking; or (iii) both.19 Accordingly, postChristensen, it was clear that such agency opinion letters are
insufficient to be tested under the Chevron framework, but it was
unclear precisely what would be sufficient or necessary to qualify
for testing under Chevron.
Second, in Mead, the Court considered a tariff clarification
ruling by the United States Customs Service.20 Similar to
Christensen, the Court found that Skidmore was the appropriate
standard by which to test the agency’s interpretation, holding
that Chevron deference applies “when it appears that Congress
has delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”21 With this proclamation, the Mead Court took a step
farther than Christensen by noting that interpretations “carrying
the force of law” are sufficient to garner Chevron deference.
Moreover, the Court went on to note in dicta that Chevron
deference can be, and has been, found “even when
no . . . administrative formality was required and none was
afforded,”22 thereby taking yet another step beyond Christensen
by stating that formal adjudication was unnecessary to garner
Chevron deference.
Reading Christensen and Mead in tandem shows that an
interpretation having the “force of law” is not only sufficient for
that interpretation to be tested under Chevron, but necessary to
do so. More specifically, post-Christensen but pre-Mead, we knew
that one of the following three scenarios was true, although we
did not know which:
1. It was necessary that the opinion letter possessed the
force of law to be tested under Chevron. Whether it resulted
from formal adjudication was irrelevant.

19. See generally id.; see also Chevron Step Zero, supra note 7, at 211–12
(discussing the ambiguity created by the analysis in Christensen).
20. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
21. Id. at 226–27 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 231.
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2. It was necessary that the opinion letter resulted from
formal adjudication to be tested under Chevron. Whether it
possessed the force of law was irrelevant.
3. It was necessary that the opinion letter possessed the
force of law and resulted from formal adjudication to be tested
under Chevron.

Subsequently, Mead’s dicta clarified that formal adjudication
is unnecessary to test an interpretation under Chevron, thereby
eliminating options two and three above. Accordingly, viewing
Christensen through the lens of Mead demonstrates that an
agency’s interpretation must possess the force of law to be tested
under Chevron.23 This conclusion seemingly was thrown into
doubt, however, by the third case in the Chevron Step Zero trio:
Barnhart.
In Barnhart, the Court considered a Social Security
Administration regulation that had been adopted after notice and
comment procedures,24 although the agency had first adopted the
interpretation informally.25 The Court found that Chevron was
the appropriate means of testing the regulation for deference,
citing Mead’s dicta for the proposition that the agency did not
lose the protection of Chevron merely because it had previously
reached its interpretation without resorting to formal
rulemaking.26 In so doing, Barnhart transformed Mead’s dicta
into binding law.27 Yet, interestingly, Barnhart did not stop there.
The Court went on to explain that Chevron deference was the
appropriate test because of (i) the interstitial nature of the legal
question; (ii) the related expertise of the agency; (iii) the
importance of the question to the administration of the statute;
(iv) the complexity of that administration; and (v) the careful
consideration the agency had given the question over a long
period of time.28

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 237–38.
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
Id. at 221–22.
Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001)).
Id. at 222.
Id.
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Predictably, the introduction of these Barnhart factors into
Chevron Step Zero threw the lower courts into “a kind of Step
Zero chaos”;29 some have maintained that Christensen and Mead
dictate that an agency interpretation must be tested under
Chevron if it carries the force of law, while others have held that
interpretations must be analyzed pursuant to Barnhart’s fivefactor test to make the same call.30 This split in authority is most
relevant to the instant matter; indeed, as demonstrated below,
Baldwin
should
be
tested
under
Skidmore
if
the
Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test governs and under Chevron if
the Barnhart five-factor test governs.
B. Applying the Chevron Step Zero Trio to Baldwin
Foremost, it is clear that Congress did not give the EEOC the
authority to promulgate regulations under Title VII.31 As such,
the EEOC cannot issue opinions interpreting Title VII that carry
the force of law.32 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that
EEOC guidance interpreting Title VII does not carry the force of
law,33 and the only court to consider whether EEOC opinions
carry the force of law has likewise concluded that they do not.34
29. Chevron Step Zero, supra note 7, at 221.
30. Compare Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913,
922 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.
2003) (applying Mead), and Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir.
2003) (same), with Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1011–13
(9th Cir. 2002) (applying Barnhart), and Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d
875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002) (same), and Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
383 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2004) (same), and Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v.
Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2002) (same). For a detailed discussion
of this split in authority, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1458–64 (2005).
31. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (“Congress, in
enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules
or regulations pursuant to that Title.”), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 995, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
32. Id.
33. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–59 (1991),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006).
34. See Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 479 F.3d 936, 943 (8th Cir. 2007)
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Thus, if the Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test governs Chevron
Step Zero, Baldwin should be tested under Skidmore.
Yet, if Barnhart’s five-factor test controls, the analysis is far
more complex. The first of the five Barnhart factors (that is,
whether the nature of the legal question at issue is
“interstitial”)35 poses a surprisingly difficult question, given that
the Court has failed to define which legal questions it considers
“interstitial” and which it does not. Indeed, the Court has only
referenced this “interstitial” language once since Barnhart, and
in so doing gave an example of an allegedly interstitial legal
question but failed to explain why the question was interstitial.36
Respected scholars have defined interstitial per Barnhart to
mean interpretations that are “less central to a [regulatory]
scheme”37 or raise less important questions of law.38 Professor
Sunstein even buttresses his view by quoting a now-famous 1986
law review article written by the author of the Barnhart
opinion—then Judge Breyer on the First Circuit Court of
Appeals: “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to
answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily
administration.”39 Accordingly, it appears that the author of the
Barnhart opinion himself believed interstitial to mean “of less
importance,” as compared to “major questions.”

(“An agency’s interpretation that is found in an opinion letter, policy statement,
agency manual or enforcement guide ‘lack[s] the force of law’ . . . .”).
35. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
36. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89–90
(2007) (“[T]he matter at issue—i.e., the calculation method for determining
whether a state aid program ‘equalizes expenditures’—is the kind of highly
technical, specialized interstitial matter that Congress often does not decide
itself, but delegates to specialized agencies to decide.”). The Court failed to
clarify whether “highly technical” and “specialized” are synonyms for
“interstitial,” or whether “interstitial” modifies the word “matter” in some other
way. Id.
37. David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons
from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1934 n.65 (2014).
38. See Chevron Step Zero, supra note 7, at 198–99 (describing how the
importance of the question of law inversely relates to its interstitial nature).
39. Id. at 200 n.62 (citing Hon. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)).
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With all due respect to these scholars, and especially to
Justice Breyer, interstitial does not mean less central to a
regulatory scheme or less important. On the contrary, interstitial
is defined as anything “related to or situated in the [spaces that
intervene between things],”40 meaning that something is
interstitial because it relates to the spaces or gaps between
things—not necessarily because it is less central to a regulatory
scheme or less important. This begs the question: when does an
agency interpretation relate to the spaces or gaps between
things? As it turns out, the Court has already answered that
question. In Brand X, the Court held that a statute has no
“gap[s]” if it “unambiguously forecloses the agency’s
interpretation.”41 Unsurprisingly, the Court has adopted a wellestablished line of precedent aimed at determining whether a
statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation—
indeed, this is the very question posed by Chevron Step One.42
Now, combine all of these propositions: The interstitial
nature of an agency interpretation is arguably relevant to
Chevron Step Zero (see the first of Barnhart’s five factors),
meaning that an agency interpretation relating to gaps (see the
dictionary definition of “interstitial”) is more apt to be tested
under Chevron than an agency interpretation that does not, and
because an interpretation relates to gaps if it progresses past
Chevron Step One (see Brand X), application of Barnhart’s five
factors implies that Chevron Step One is relevant to determining
Chevron Step Zero. In other words, if an agency’s interpretation
would progress from Chevron Step One to Chevron Step Two,
then the agency’s interpretation is necessarily interstitial, which
supports a finding that Chevron is the appropriate standard à la
Barnhart’s multi-factor test of Chevron Step Zero. Notably, such
40. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 655 (11th ed. 2006).
41. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 983 (2005).
42. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007)
(“Neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the Secretary’s
method would be determinative if the statute’s plain language unambiguously
indicated Congress’ intent to foreclose the Secretary’s interpretation.”) (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984)).

SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION

265

an interpretation is consistent with Barnhart itself because the
Barnhart Court’s analysis proceeded to Chevron Step Two.43
Applying this understanding of Barnhart here, the EEOC’s
opinion in Baldwin must be interstitial because Congress has
never spoken on the precise issue of whether sexual orientation
qualifies as sex discrimination,44 thereby implying that the
agency’s interpretation would progress from Chevron Step One to
Step Two, were Chevron the appropriate standard. Accordingly,
this factor weighs in favor of Chevron being the appropriate test
here. Note that courts would likely reach the opposite result if
interstitial meant less central to a regulatory scheme or less
important. In fact, there arguably are fewer issues of more
importance to Title VII than which classifications are protected
and which are not, and scant issues enjoy more importance today
than whether employers should have the right to discriminate
against applicants and employees on the basis of their sexual
orientation; after all, the inclusion of “sexual orientation” as
stand-alone language in Title VII has been raised in practically
every congressional session for the past twenty years.45
The second Barnhart factor concerns the agency’s related
expertise.46 The EEOC certainly carries expertise in what
constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII, as it serves as the
sole federal agency charged with enforcing that statute.47 Hence,
this factor strongly supports testing Baldwin under Chevron.
The third Barnhart factor asks not whether the
interpretation is important generally, but whether the
43. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2002) (proceeding from a
determination that the statute was ambiguous to an assessment of whether the
agency interpretation was reasonable).
44. See Michael Gold, 7 Questions About the Employment NonDiscrimination Act You Needed Answered, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-11-04/features/bal-questions-about-theemployment-nondiscrimination-act-20131104_1_gender-identity-enda-senatevote (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (discussing the lack of existing federal legislation
protecting sexual orientation from discrimination) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
45. Id.
46. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 253
(1964).
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interpretation is important “to the administration of the
statute.”48 Here, the EEOC’s Baldwin opinion is incredibly
important to the administration of Title VII because it
determines whether the EEOC will accept and pursue charges of
discrimination alleging sexual orientation discrimination. Had
the Baldwin decision determined that sexual orientation
discrimination is not tantamount to sex discrimination, the
EEOC’s administration of Title VII would be markedly different
going forward. As such, this factor almost assuredly weighs in
favor of Chevron being the appropriate test here.
The fourth Barnhart factor concerns the complexity of the
agency’s administration of the statute,49 where (ostensibly) the
more complex the administration of a statute, the more likely the
agency’s interpretation would be to trigger Chevron as the
appropriate test. Here, Title VII is simply not a complex statute,
especially when contrasted against the Social Security Act,50
which the Barnhart Court identified as being complex.51 For one
thing, if a statute is complex, it would be more likely that
Congress would vest in the agency responsible for administering
that statute the right to promulgate regulations to ensure its
appropriate administration. Yet, as noted above, Congress did not
vest in the EEOC the power to promulgate regulations under
Title VII.52 Moreover, the sheer breadth of the Social Security Act
(over 70 sections spanning over 1000 pages) dwarfs that of Title
VII (16 sections spanning 14 pages).53 Accordingly, this factor
arguably weighs in favor of Skidmore being the appropriate test
for Baldwin.
The fifth and final Barnhart factor asks about “the careful
consideration the agency had given the question over a long

48. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
49. Id.
50. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
51. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222–25 (2002) (describing the
many components of the statute and the kinds of claims it encompasses).
52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
53. Compare 49 Stat. 620 (detailing the administration of social security
benefits), with Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (providing for equal employment opportunities).
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period of time.”54 As the Supreme Court has held, an EEOC
interpretation “does not fare well” when it was neither
contemporaneous with its enactment nor consistent since the
statute came into law.55 Applying that standard here, this factor
strongly supports testing the opinion under Skidmore because
Baldwin was issued over fifty years after Title VII passed and
because the EEOC concedes that it held a contrary view of Title
VII until very recently.56
In sum, three of the five Barnhart factors arguably weigh in
favor of Baldwin being tested under Chevron, whereas two
factors arguably point toward Skidmore as the appropriate test.
All factors being equal (an assumption that certainly could be
challenged), Baldwin should be tested under Chevron if the
Barnhart factors control the Chevron Step Zero analysis. Yet, to
say this conclusion is tenuous is a gross understatement as it
relies upon a novel interpretation of the word interstitial, as well
as several assumptions that could rightly be deemed judgment
calls (for example, that the question posed in Baldwin is
important to the administration of Title VII). As such, my point
here is not that Baldwin would be tested under Chevron if the
Barnhart test controls, but that Baldwin could—and probably
should—be tested under Chevron if the Barnhart test controls.
This Article aims only to demonstrate the need for clarification
from the Court, given that the Christensen/Mead line of cases and
Barnhart arguably point in different directions when applied to
the Baldwin opinion.
C. Which Approach Is Correct?
The Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test should control
Chevron Step Zero. Foremost, had the Barnhart Court meant to
54. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
55. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991)
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006).
56. See supra note 2 (noting that in Baldwin the EEOC opined for the first
time that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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revise its rule-of-law test—a test it had endorsed just a term
earlier in Mead—it almost assuredly would have done so
explicitly. And, if that were the case, the Court probably would
have devoted more than a single paragraph to revising itself.
Moreover, the Barnhart Court did not need the five-factor test to
arrive at the result it reached, further suggesting that the factors
were mere dicta. Indeed, the Court noted that the regulations at
issue had the force of law and subsequently concluded that the
agency’s interpretation should be tested under Chevron. That
conclusion is hardly novel; it is the very conclusion reached by the
Mead court, which Barnhart approvingly cites.
Subjecting Baldwin to the Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test,
the result is clear: the Baldwin opinion does not have the force of
law because the EEOC has not promulgated regulations
implementing Title VII. As such, the opinion must be tested
under Skidmore, not Chevron.57 Applying Skidmore to Baldwin
does not bode well for the EEOC. Arguably, the first Skidmore
factor—the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning—is a toss-up,
weighing neither for, nor against, deference. True: the opinion is
thorough when discussing the points of view that support its
conclusion, but it fails to distinguish the myriad cases holding
that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is
not tantamount to sex discrimination under Title VII. A thorough
argument not only illuminates those propositions that support it,
but also decries those propositions that oppose it.58 Baldwin
accomplishes only half of this imperative.

57. See also Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing
Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74
MO. L. REV. 949, 976 (2009) (“Under the relevant standards of agency deference,
even the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII created using formal procedures
are entitled to, at most, Skidmore deference, not Chevron deference.”).
58. HOWARD KAHANE & NANCY CAVENDER, LOGIC AND CONTEMPORARY
RHETORIC: THE USE OF REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 226 (10th ed. 2006) (“Never
simply ignore counterarguments or reasons.”); WILLIAM PUTMAN & JENNIFER
ALBRIGHT, LEGAL RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND WRITING 213 (3d ed. 2002)
(“Counteranalysis
is
the
process
of
discovering
and
presenting
counterarguments to a legal position or argument. It is important because to
adequately address a legal problem, all aspects of the problem must be
considered.”).
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The second and fourth Skidmore factors—the validity of the
agency’s reasoning and the agency’s “power to persuade”—have
always confused scholars.59 They appear to encourage courts to
defer to agency interpretations that are well-reasoned. Yet, that
proposition is puzzling. The very notion contravenes the theory of
deference to administrative agencies; the necessity of deference to
administrative agency opinions is borne of a divergence between
the agency’s view and that of the judiciary. If those views
harmonized, there would be no need for deference. As such, this
Article finds only that these factors encourage a court to “defer”
to the EEOC if it already agrees with the EEOC’s opinion. Again,
therefore, these factors are a toss-up when it comes to a court
deferring to Baldwin.
Finally, the third Skidmore factor—the agency’s consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements—weighs strongly against
the EEOC. As noted above, in Baldwin itself the agency concedes
that the opinion contradicts earlier-held agency interpretations.60
Thus, it is difficult to definitively argue that any of the Skidmore
factors weigh in favor of deferring to the EEOC. At most, the
Baldwin decision should earn de minimis deference under
Skidmore, yet it seems more reasonable that Baldwin should
earn no deference at all.
III. A Brand X for Skidmore Deference?
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Maislin Industries, Inc. v.
Primary Steel,61 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,62 and Neal v. United
59. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial
Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 39, 58 (2003) (noting that, although “deference is compatible with a court[]
ultimately reaching a conclusion different from the agency’s after weighing the
agency’s opinion,” it is “incompatible with reviewing the agency’s interpretation
only after the court has already interpreted the statute, and rejecting the
agency opinion if it does not coincide with the court’s”).
60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (presenting the EEOC’s
evolution of interpretation regarding sexual discrimination under Title VII).
61. 497 U.S. 116 (1990), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Allstate Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., No. 2: 93-CV-323, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21540, at *11 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 1994). See id. at 131 (noting that, if the court
finds the statute to be clear, it must adhere to stare decisis and the court must
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States63 made it clear that if a court had previously found a
statute to be unambiguous, then a subsequent, contrary agency
interpretation of that statute would not trump traditional notions
of stare decisis, regardless of what level of deference the
interpretation was entitled to.64 In other words, if a court has
already found a statute to be clear, an agency cannot change that
interpretation. After all, “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”65
But, what if the law is unclear and Congress has vested in an
administrative agency the authority to fill in the gaps? That issue
was front and center in Brand X, where the Supreme Court held
that if a court has not found a statute to be unambiguous, a
subsequent, contrary agency interpretation of that statute that
otherwise would have been entitled to Chevron deference would
trump stare decisis.66 In other words, so long as an agency is
filling in the gaps by interpreting an unclear statute and that
agency is acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority
to do so, then the agency’s interpretation should control (within
the bounds of reason), despite a court’s prior pronouncement.
“judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior
determination of the statute’s meaning”).
62. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). See id. at 536–37 (quoting Maislin, 497 U.S. at
131) (“Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that
determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later
interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s
meaning.”).
63. 516 U.S. 284 (1996). See id. at 295 (“Our reluctance to overturn
precedents derives in part from institutional concerns about the relationship of
the Judiciary to Congress. One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis
in the area of statutory construction is that ‘Congress is free to change this
Court’s interpretation of its legislation.’”).
64. See also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (ruling that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference
only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion”).
65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
66. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–85 (deciding that, instead of adhering to
its own judicial precedent regarding an interpretation of Communications Act,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should have accorded a Federal
Communications Commission ruling Chevron deference).
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The Supreme Court, however, has yet to fill in the final blank
in this line of cases. That is, if a court has not found a statute to
be unambiguous, should stare decisis prevail in the face of a
subsequent, contrary agency interpretation that would not
otherwise have been entitled to Chevron deference (for instance,
the interpretation would have otherwise been entitled only to
some level of Skidmore deference)?67 In other words, if a court has
already interpreted a statute to mean A, but that court declines
to hold that the statute is clear, can an agency fill in the gaps by
interpreting the unclear statute to mean B, even if it acts without
the force of law?
Scholars are divided on how to answer this question,68
although the lower courts appear to have held uniformly that
stare decisis trumps an agency interpretation of an unclear
statute unless and until the agency issues regulations to the
contrary that earn Chevron deference.69 The Brand X opinion
67. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1304–05 (2007) (“Skidmore is
neither discussed nor even cited in any of the opinions issued in Brand X, even
though Skidmore deference shares the same tension with stare decisis as
Chevron previously did.”).
68. Compare Bressman, supra note 30 at 1467 n.157 (asserting that an
agency interpretation of an unclear statute entitled only to Skidmore deference
should trump a court’s prior, contrary opinion), and Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2001 n.285 (2008)
(“Professor Galle . . . believes it is inevitable that there soon will be a Brand X
for the Skidmore doctrine.”), with Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being
Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of
Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 845
(2010) (“It is uncertain, but may be unlikely, that an authoritative agency
interpretation that is eligible for Skidmore, but not Chevron, deference can
displace a judicial interpretation that was made in the absence of an agency
interpretation.”), and Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts
Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61
EMORY L.J. 1, 41 (2011) (describing how Brand X requires, under Chevron, a
court to accept an agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute,
even if the court has already disagreed with that interpretation, as opposed to
“lesser standards of deference,” such as that of Skidmore, which “do not demand
that a court give up its prerogative to discern the ‘best’ interpretation of a
statute”), and Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, supra note 67, at
1305 (“[I]t is far from clear . . . that Skidmore should trump judicial precedent.”).
69. See White & Case LLP v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 12, 23 (2009)
(declining to give the agency’s decision any form of deference); Michael Simon
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itself purports to answer the question, albeit in dicta. Specifically,
the Brand X majority responds to the concerns of Justice Scalia’s
dissent—that is, that the opinion makes “judicial decisions
subject to reversal by executive officers”—by explaining that an
agency vested with congressional authority to administer
ambiguous statutes “remains the authoritative interpreter
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In all other
respects, the court’s prior ruling remains binding law (for
example, as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is
inapplicable).”70
Yet,
because
the
underlying
agency
interpretation at issue in Brand X was entitled to Chevron
deference, the Court’s observation is not binding.
The resolution of this open issue is paramount here because
none of the courts to address whether sexual orientation
discrimination is tantamount to sex discrimination under Title
VII have held that Title VII is clear on the issue (nor should they,
because Title VII is anything but clear on the matter), and the
overwhelming majority of those courts have reached the opposite
conclusion as the EEOC.71 This unique procedural posture
Design, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the
government’s argument that the court “did not accord the appropriate deference
to Customs’ rulings as called for by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Mead. . . .”).
70. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005); see also Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power,
and the Varieties of Environmental Litigation: Symposium: The Jurisprudence
of Justice Stevens: Panel III: Administrative Law/Statutory Interpretation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 2006 (2006) (citing the Brand X dicta for the proposition
that “the Court seems to be acknowledging, albeit in passing, judicial power to
articulate ‘binding law’ on the basis of ambiguous statutes in some cases” (that
is, where Chevron deference does not apply)).
71. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir.
2006) (“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts
under Title VII.”); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Title VII’s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a
person’s sexuality.”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation.”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Title VII
does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”);
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[H]arassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation
(and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”);
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)
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positions Baldwin as a vehicle to answer the question left open
after Maislin, Lechmere, Neal, and Brand X—assuming, of
course, that the reviewing court maintains that Title VII is
ambiguous on this issue and that binding precedent would
compel the court to hold that sexual orientation discrimination
would not run afoul of Title VII but for some modicum of
Skidmore deference owed to Baldwin.72
To begin answering that question, we must ask why Maislin,
Lechmere, and Neal favored stare decisis over agency
interpretations and why Brand X did not. First, the Brand X
Court noted that Chevron deference should trump precedent
interpreting an ambiguous statute because of rule of law
concerns. As the Court explained, “Chevron established a
‘presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
(“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual
orientation.”); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir.
1996) (“Title VII does not prohibit conduct based on the employee’s sexual
orientation, whether homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual.”); Williamson v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should
not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.”);
Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (“We . . . hold
that Title VII cannot be strained to [forbid an employer from rejecting a job
applicant based on his or her affectional or sexual preference].”). But see Terveer
v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying an employer’s
motion to dismiss an employee’s claim under Title VII that his sexual
orientation was not consistent with the employer’s gender stereotypes).
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by the Fifth Circuit’s Smith decision
above because, “[u]nder Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), [the Eleventh Circuit] is bound by cases decided by the
former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.” Baloco v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d
1338, 1343 n.6 (11th Cir. 2011).
72. Although no court should conclude that Title VII is clear here, I readily
concede that a reviewing court could distinguish controlling precedent, thereby
obviating the need to reach the instant tension between stare decisis and
Skidmore deference. For example, despite the near ubiquity of circuit courts
dismissing claims of sexual orientation discrimination of Title VII, several of
these opinions predate relevant legal theories that could point the court in the
opposite direction (for example, the gender stereotyping theory announced in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“In the specific context of
sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”)).
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meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency,
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.’”73 Yet, were
the Court to have held that stare decisis trumped Chevron
deference, reviewing courts could have reached divergent results
based solely upon the order in which the court and agency issued
their interpretations. For example, assume a court construes an
unclear statute to mean A before an agency promulgates
regulations implementing it. If the agency then issues regulations
stating that the statute means B, a court construing that statute
thereafter would be bound by Chevron to find that the statute
means B—assuming that such a construction is reasonable. As
per Brand X, the possibility of such anomalous results counsels in
favor of Chevron deference trumping contrary court
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Second, the Brand X Court cited a separation of powers
rationale. The majority echoed the concern Justice Scalia raised
in his dissent in Mead that favoring stare decisis could ossify
large swaths of statutory law, thereby eliminating the “exercise of
continuing agency discretion,” despite Congress having vested in
an agency that very discretion.74 This apparent ability of the
judicial branch to thwart the legislative branch and divest
authority from the executive branch likewise counsels against
upholding traditional notions of stare decisis here.
Now, apply these dual rationales to our instant dilemma.
Both rationales presuppose that Congress has vested in the
agency the power to promulgate regulations implementing the
73. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735,
740–41 (1996)).
74. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “[w]orst of all, the majority’s approach will lead to the
ossification of large portions of our statutory law. Where Chevron applies,
statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities subject to the agency’s ongoing
clarification. They create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing
agency discretion.”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) (discussing the ossification as a result of “precluding
agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes” and
noting that “[n]either Chevron nor the doctrine of stare decisis requires these
haphazard results”) (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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statute in question. Yet, as noted above, Congress has not vested
in the EEOC the power to promulgate regulations under Title
VII.75 Absent such congressional authority, the rule-of-law
concern that the Brand X Court cited loses some of its strength.
On one hand, courts could reach discordant holdings simply on
account of an interposed agency interpretation. For example,
assume a court interprets an unclear statute to mean A and an
agency later issues informal guidance interpreting that statute to
mean B. A court subsequently reviewing the statute could find it
appropriate to afford the informal guidance Skidmore deference
and that doing so tips the scales in favor of the agency’s position.
Such a result is not preordained, however; whereas a court bound
by Chevron deference would be required to favor the agency’s
position so long as it is reasonable, Skidmore requires far less
deference to an agency’s position. What results is less risk of a
rule-of-law problem, although the problem certainly persists.
Moreover, while it takes months, or even years, for an agency
to navigate the notice-and-comment period required to
promulgate regulations entitled to Chevron deference, there are
no preconditions to an agency issuing an immediate
interpretation deserving of Skidmore deference. Thus, agencies
could eliminate any potential rule-of-law concerns by simply
announcing their interpretation of a statute before courts have
the opportunity to review that statute—or, at the very latest, via
an amicus brief during pending litigation.
On a similar note, Brand X’s separation-of-powers rationale
for favoring deference over stare decisis fades away entirely.
After all, the judicial branch cannot thwart a congressional grant
of authority when Congress has failed to grant such authority in
the first place. While the risk of statutory law being ossified
persists, it is not the mere freezing of statutory law that
concerned the Brand X majority; what concerned the Court was
the freezing of statutory law in the face of Congress vesting in an
agency discretion to interpret a statute and change its mind as it
pleases. That concern simply does not exist here, given that
Congress has vested no such authority in the EEOC.76
75.
76.

See supra note 31.
Id.

276

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 255 (2015)

In sum, in light of rule-of-law and separation-of-powers
concerns, Brand X announced a limited exception to stare decisis
in the face of contrary agency interpretations of unclear statutes
deserving of Chevron deference. Yet, when an agency
interpretation of an unclear statute earns mere Skidmore
deference—as Baldwin should earn—the agency can eliminate
any rule-of-law concerns—limited as they may be—by making its
position known immediately. Moreover, the specter of a
separation-of-powers concern simply does not exist here because
Congress has not vested the EEOC with any authority to
promulgate regulations pursuant to Title VII. As such, there is no
reason to deviate from stare decisis here. Assuming a court
resolves that Title VII is ambiguous concerning its applicability
to prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, and so long as
that court has already held that sexual orientation discrimination
does not violate Title VII and there exists no way to distinguish
that authority from the case at bar—the court should not
overturn its own decision solely because of the Skidmore
deference Baldwin earns.77
IV. Conclusion
Baldwin certainly serves as a tool to spread the news that
the EEOC’s doors are open to claims of sexual orientation
discrimination and further serves as a repository for future
77. This Article does not address the interplay between stare decisis and a
contrary agency interpretation of an unclear statute that earns Skidmore
deference when the agency has been vested with congressional authority to
promulgate regulations implementing that statute (for instance, the
interpretation could earn Chevron deference if the agency simply went through
the required notice-and-comment period), but the agency has failed to issue such
regulations. In such a case, “[b]ecause of the possibility that any judicial
interpretation could be subsequently overridden by the agency, requiring a court
to at least consider deference under Skidmore promotes judicial and
administrative efficiency, and rule-of-law values in the predictability and
stability of law.” Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory
Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the
Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 482 (2013). These countervailing
concerns certainly support a Brand X-style exception to notions of stare decisis,
although whether they are enough to tip the scales in favor of Skidmore
deference remains to be seen.
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litigants of some of the arguments plaintiffs have raised, and can
raise, concerning sexual orientation discrimination under Title
VII. Moreover, the opinion provides useful persuasive authority
for those litigants seeking to distinguish cases that have held
that such discrimination does not run afoul of Title VII and for
those litigants who find themselves in that small universe of
courts yet to address the viability of sexual orientation
discrimination claims under Title VII.
Yet, a watershed moment for advocates of LGBT workplace
equality Baldwin is not. Indeed, because Skidmore should serve
as the appropriate test by which to measure the level of deference
courts should afford to any EEOC opinion, because Baldwin
should garner de minimis deference under Skidmore, and because
courts should not overturn their own precedent in the face of an
EEOC opinion interpreting Title VII that earns such Skidmore
deference, Baldwin should have no effect on the majority of
courts in this country. Despite the EEOC’s efforts to fight LGBT
discrimination in the workplace, the only way to ensure that
courts will view Title VII as prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is for Congress
to do what it should have done ages ago: pass the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act78 or its fresh-faced contemporary, the
Equality Act.79

78. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong.
(2013).
79. Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015).

